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INTRODUCTION

One of the most profound tests of trust in a society is when the state
must be relied upon to hold itself accountable for violating the rights of the
governed. Nowhere is this more true than in the context of the prosecution
of law enforcement officers for unjustified violence against civilians. The
reasons for this are twofold. First, it should go without saying that police
perform a vital - and extremely difficult and dangerous - function, and
bravely serve as the prophylactic between civil society and complete chaos.'
As President Obama recently wrote, "[p]olice officers are the heroic backbone of our communities." 2 Law enforcement officers, most of whom serve
honorably, responsibly, and often heroically, deserve not only our gratitude
and respect, but - when accused of misconduct - also the due process we
aspire to afford all defendants.
A second reason is that prosecutors - the very ministers of justice we
rely upon for accountability - work with and depend upon law enforcement
officers in the discharge of their duties. Police officers are the front-line
representatives of the law enforcement complex of which prosecutors are a
part. Police officers exercise discretion, gather evidence, apprehend individuals so that they can face justice, and bring cases for prosecution. In most
criminal cases, law enforcement officers work hand in hand with prosecutors
toward a shared goal of bringing criminal offenders to justice. Thus, it is no
surprise that some express doubts about the ability of prosecutors' offices to
fairly evaluate and prosecute allegations against police officers in their
jurisdictions. 3
However, there is another criminal justice actor that potentially further
complicates this picture. The grand jury is an ancient, but often misunderstood, vehicle for community influence in the criminal justice system. It
once enjoyed a reputation as a "bulwark" of liberty,4 designed to shield
individuals from meritless prosecutions by requiring the acquiescence of
laypeople in the initiation of criminal charges.' This reputation was ce'See Barack Obama, The President's Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REv. 811, 840 (2017).
2 Id. at 840.
See, e.g., J. Vincent Aprile II, Challenging The Grand Jury Prosecutor's Conflict of
Interest, 31 CRIM. JUST. 34, 34 (2016); Brad Schrade, Can Prosecutors Be Fair in Police
Shooting Cases?, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (March 18, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/
news/state-regional-govt-politics/can-prosecutors-fair-police-shooting-cases/b8pGMJtzA6
HDCY21JCAVOJ/, archived at https://perma.cc/YT8K-C445.
4 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 589 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
'See U.S. Const., amend. V; Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 (requiring prosecution by indictment for
offenses punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one year). See generally Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REv. 398,
408-11 (2006) (reviewing the historical evolution of the grand jury in English and early American common law); Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the HistoricRole of the GrandJury,
10 AM. CruM. L. Rev. 701, 701-02 (1971-72) (discussing the grand jury function of shielding
individual liberty against prosecutorial overreach by the Crown).
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mented during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when grand juries in
England and colonial America were seen as important safeguards against
governmental overreaching.6 Indeed, the grand jury's prestige during these
eras led to the right to grand jury indictment being enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.'
In modem times, however, the grand jury has become known as the
captive of the prosecutor.' Instead of a protection for those accused of criminal offenses, today's grand jury is seen by many primarily as a potent investigative tool for the government. 9 This perception is driven in large part by
the fact that grand juries almost never vote to decline an indictment. 0
Nearly every time a prosecutor asks a grand jury to return an indictment in a
case, the grand jury complies.I'
Given the grand jury's track record, many have expressed serious concerns about the recent spate of cases in which grand juries have declined to
indict law enforcement officers accused of killing unarmed civilians. 12 The
shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the asphyxiation death of Eric Garner on Staten Island, New York - both at the hands of
law enforcement officers - galvanized a movement and sparked a national
conversation about race and policing. 3 The grand juries' decisions not to
67 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 701; see also Fairfax, Jr., supra note 5, at 409-10.

See, e.g., GEORGE J. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY: AN ESSAY 15 (1906), http://constitution.org/gje/gje.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8ACY-V2K6; Fairfax, Jr., supra note 5, at
410-12.
' See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 323 (1995).
9
See id. at 314-16.
6o See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005).
But see
Susan W. Brenner, GrandJurors Speak, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
GRAND JURY 25, 25-27 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) (noting the conscientiousness of
grand jurors); Frank 0. Bowman, III, VoxPopuli: Robert McCulloch, Ferguson, & the Roles of
Prosecutorsand Grand Juries in High-Profile Cases, 80 Mo. L. REV. 1111, 1123-24 (2015)
(discussing the seriousness with which grand jurors take their role); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
GrandJury Innovation: Toward a FunctionalMakeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19
WM. & MARY BLL RTS. J. 339, 342-44 (2010) (defending the grand jury against the charge of
over-compliance).
" See Mark Motivans, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Federal Justice Statistics 2010 - Statistical
Tables (2013); Stephanos Bibas, Transparencyand Participationin Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 929 (2006) (arguing that grand juries "are dominated by prosecutors and
would 'indict a ham sandwich' if prosecutors asked them to do so."). But see Fairfax, Jr.,
supra note 10, at 343-44 (highlighting alternative reasons, other than pliancy, for high rate of
indictment).
12 See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After GrandJury Doesn't
Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-islandchokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html, archived at https://perma.cc/K5LR-Y5 89; Monica Davey
& Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shootingmichael-brown-grand-jury.html, archived at https://perma.cc/5GTQ-K2ZA; see also Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., Should the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 HOWARD L. J. 825,
826-27 (2015).
" In August of 2014, Darren Wilson, a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri fatally shot an
18-year-old unarmed African-American young man named Michael Brown. See, e.g., What
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indict in these and other cases caused many to attack the grand jury and its
use in cases in which law enforcement officers are accused of unjustified
violence.1 4 However, it appears that these contemporary cases mimic historical patterns in police violence cases." Indeed, grand juries almost never
6
indict police officers in these types of cases.'

Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/3YYH-D8GV. The grand jury in the case declined to issue an indictment
against Officer Wilson in the case. See Chico Harlan et al., Ferguson Police Officer Won't be
Charged in Fatal Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
2
politics/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-case-of-ferguson-officer/ 014/11/24/de48e7e4-71d7archived at https://perma
I1e4-893f-86bd390a3340-story.html?utmterm=.27b274ae0de3,
.cclM9RB-KSCV; see also Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a Ferguson Street,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/michael-brown-abodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html, archived at https://perma.cc/2SL8-VY3F;
Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struck at Least 6 Times, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-brown-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-at-least6-times.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3VSQ-4E9U.
In July of 2014, New York Police Department officers Justin Damico and Daniel Pantaleo
confronted a 43-year-old unarmed African-American man named Eric Garner, who was allegedly selling untaxed tobacco cigarettes in front of a Staten Island store. Officer Pantaleo
placed Mr. Garner in a NYPD-prohibited chokehold and brought him to the ground, maintaining the hold even as Mr. Garner gasped, "I can't breathe," repeatedly before losing consciousness and going into cardiac arrest and dying. See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The
Path to Eric Garner'sDeath, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
archived at https://perma.cc/
14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html,
XT9M-SHAT. The grand jury in the case declined to return an indictment against Officer
Pantaleo. See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of ProtestsAfter GrandJury Doesn't
Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-choke
hold-death-of-eric-garner.html, archived at https://perma.cc/P9LM-K8XT.
14 See, e.g., LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, Abolish Grand Juries: Justicefor Eric Garner and
Michael Brown, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2014/12/abolish-grand-juries justice for_eric garerand michael brown.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/KQ2E-MK25; Tierney Sneed, Garner, Brown Decisions Spark
Calls for GrandJury Reform, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/artiarchcles/2014/12/12/after-eric-gamer-michael-brown-decisions-calls-for-grand-jury-reform,
ived at https://perma.cc/K22F-E7Q3.
" See, e.g., Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEo. L.J. 745, 763-64 (2016)
(citing studies showing small numbers of indictments of police in the period beginning 2000 or
2005); James C. McKinley & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, With Exceptions, Favors the Police in Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/nyregion/
grand-juries-seldom-charge-police-officers-in-fatal-actions.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
9XKD-YR43 (noting that a 2014 indictment of a Charlotte-Mecklenberg police officer who
killed an unarmed black man was the first officer from that department indicted in a fatal
police shooting in 30 years).
6See, e.g., Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly Rare for a Grand Jury to do What Ferguson's
Just Did, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014), https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/fergusonmichael-brown-indictment-darren-wilson, archived at https://perma.cc/45Z3-FXH6 (describing procedural and substantive issues that may make grand juries less likely to indict officers
compared to other potential defendants); see also Letter from Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., to Judge Maura McShane, 21st Judicial Circuit, Clayton, Missouri (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/caseissue/NAAC
P%20LDF%2oLetter%20to%2OJudge%20Maura%20McShane.pdf, archived at https://perma
.cc/LE5E-YVPF.
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This article seeks to explore why this is, taking into account the role
and function of the grand jury, and the issues and realities associated with
the prosecution of police violence. The article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the grand jury's historical role in the United States and the function it plays in today's criminal justice system. Part II then examines the
challenges to obtaining grand jury indictments in cases involving police violence and identifies common themes and obstacles to grand jury indictment
in these cases - in particular, certain structural features of the grand jury
and the role of the prosecutor. Finally, Part III critiques the various reform
proposals that have emerged in recent years and advances a number of ideas
for enhancing the role of the grand jury in cases involving unjustified police
violence against civilians.

I.

THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY

The grand jury is a body of laypeople, typically numbering between
more than a dozen and fewer than two dozen, tasked with determining
whether there is a sufficient basis for charges to proceed to trial.'" The prosecutor is responsible for presenting evidence, in secret, 9 to the grand jury
that establishes probable cause to believe that the accused committed the
charged offense. In gathering this evidence, the prosecutor has access to the
grand jury's subpoena authority, which can compel both sworn testimony
and the production of tangible evidence. 20 If the grand jury is persuaded by
the prosecutor's presentation of evidence that there is probable cause, it typically returns an indictment. 21 The defendant must then face trial on the
charges in the indictment.
A grand jury indictment is required in felony cases in the federal system and in about half of the states. 22 The chief alternative to the grand jury
indictment requirement is the preliminary hearing, which involves the prosecutor presenting evidence in an open courtroom proceeding in an effort to
persuade a judge that probable cause exists to hold a defendant over for
trial.23 Unlike in the grand jury, preliminary hearings allow defense counsel
" See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1); see SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND

PRACTICE § 4:8 (2d. ed. 2015).
" See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1). But see Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and ConstitutionalDesign, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 719-20, 743-45 (2008) (exploring whether grand juries should exercise discretion beyond merely determining whether there
is sufficient evidence for an indictment).
'9 See BEALE ET. AL, supra note 17, at § 1:6.
20 See R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO. J. LEoAL ETHICS
361, 363 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, Retelling Grand Jury History, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 125, 142-47 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr., ed., 2011);
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., GrandJury Innovation: Toward a FunctionalMakeover of the Ancient
Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM & MARY BLL RTS. J. 339, 343 n.20 (2010).
22 See BEALE ET. AL, supra note 17, at § 1:1; Fairfax, Jr., supra note
18, at 743-45.
23 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.250.
1 (West).

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

402

[Vol. 52

to be present, cross-examine government witnesses, and challenge the prosecution's evidence. 2 4 Some jurisdictions give the prosecutor a choice between
25
the two methods of initiating criminal cases.
In those jurisdictions and cases in which the grand jury is the arbiter of
whether charges proceed to trial, the grand jury is an important, communitybased protection for an individual accused of a crime. The grand jurors are
in a position to shield a defendant from the allegations of a biased or corrupt
prosecutor seeking to bring a baseless case. Although a criminal defendant
always has the subsequent opportunity to prevail at trial, the grand jury can
prevent an individual from ever having to defend against meritless charges
and face the stigma as well as the reputational and litigation costs of formal
accusation. 26
Despite its important role, the grand jury is one of the least understood
elements of the American criminal justice system. While those accused of
crime are often perplexed by the intricacies of the procedures employed by
the state to adjudicate their cases, virtually everyone with an interest in the
criminal process - prosecutors, defense lawyers, victims, defendants, and
the public - seems to lack a complete understanding of what the grand jury
is and what it is supposed to do.
The primary reason for this is that the grand jury operates out of the
public gaze and is even shrouded from the view of most lawyers. Secrecy
rules typically limit those who may be in the grand jury room to the grand
jurors, the prosecutor, and the testifying witness. 27 These secrecy rules also
often prohibit everyone except the witness from divulging what took place
during grand jury proceedings.2 8 Violation of these secrecy rules may result
in civil or criminal contempt of court.29 Grand jury secrecy is designed to
serve worthy goals, such as protecting the reputations of individuals who are
under investigation but are ultimately cleared, cloaking the identity and
safety of grand jurors and witnesses, and preventing those under investigation from fleeing justice. 0 But whatever its underlying rationale, grand jury
secrecy severely cramps public understanding of the institution. This basic
lack of exposure leads to everything from unrealistic expectations to outright
fantasy about what can be expected from the grand jury in a given case.

24 Id.

See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 545.010 (West).
Although criminal cases may be dismissed before trial for a myriad of reasons, including a finding of no probable cause by a judge at a preliminary hearing, see, e.g., FED. R. CRim.
P. 5.1, the grand jury is the only lay entity that can protect a defendant from having to defend
against unfounded charges at trial. See also FED. R. CRuM. P. 12.
27 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
28 See FED. R. CRiu. P. 6(e).
2 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7).
3 See Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 748 (2008); see generally Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor:Explaining the DemocraticFunction of the Federal GrandJury, 94 GEo. L.
J. 1266 (2006).
25

26
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The second barrier to public appreciation for the grand jury is that the
institution is, by its very nature, limited in its role and function. Despite the
attention paid to the grand jury, some lose sight of the notion that it is an
early procedural step potentially leading to the subsequent dispositive determinations of verdict after jury or bench trial. Grand juries do not resolve the
ultimate issue of culpability; rather, they simply determine whether or not
there is enough evidence to establish probable cause and that the case
against the defendant should proceed. Although there is room for debate
over whether the grand jury should take a more active role in exercising
discretion over whether prosecutions should go forward,31 it is the case that
the entity has, at most, a preliminary role. Its decision to indict is necessarily subordinated to that of the petit jury or, more often, a judge presiding
over a guilty plea.
II.

STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES TO OBTAINING GRAND
JURY INDICTMENTS IN

CASES

INVOLVING

POLICE VIOLENCE

As mentioned above, the American grand jury often is criticized for
indicting too frequently." Commentators have advanced a variety of reasons for the grand jury's perceived ineffectiveness as a protection for defendants. Among these are the secrecy of the grand jury process, the lack of
information given to grand jurors regarding their role, and the unchecked
prosecutorial control of the grand jury given the fact that neither a judge nor
a defense lawyer participates in the process.33 However, despite these articulated reasons why grand juries almost always indict, it is also true that grand
juries very rarely indict in cases involving allegations of unjustified police
violence.3 4 This Part explores how some of the structural features of the
grand jury - in particular, the role of grand jury secrecy and prosecutorial
dominance of the grand jury - work to create this discrepancy.
A.

Grand Jury Secrecy

Grand jury secrecy is an integral part of the American grand jury. It is
fair to trace the respect for the need for secrecy in the grand jury process to
two English cases often associated with the evolution of the grand jury's
protective function." During the reign of Charles II, criminal cases were
pursued against certain religious rivals of the monarchy, including Stephen
Colledge and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury.3 6 In the face
' See Kuckes, supra note 30, at 1268-69.
32

See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 11; see also Fairfax, Jr., supra note 10, at 342.

" See id.
34 See supra text accompanying notes 15 & 16.

3 See Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 703, 721-22.
36 See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 14; Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an
American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 9

(1996).
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of tremendous pressure from the King, London grand juries refused to return
indictments against the two dissidents after insisting on hearing certain testimony in private despite the monarch's prosecutors seeking to have all evidence heard by the grand jurors in open court.37 A second example can be
found a little more than a century later in a fledgling new America, when
Pennsylvania grand jurors resisted a libel prosecution against a newspaper
publisher who had been critical of the court.3 8 There, the grand jurors held
firm to their convictions in spite of the tongue-lashing they received from
the judges in open court.3 9
These cases demonstrate the importance of grand jury secrecy for protecting witnesses and supporting their ability to give free and open testimony
without fear of reprisal. 40 They also show that grand jurors themselves
should be insulated from external pressure during their investigations and
deliberations, and protected against retaliation or coercion after their decisions. 4 1 Another important reason for grand jury secrecy is the need to conceal sensitive investigations from potential defendants who might flee after
becoming aware of the probe. Finally, the grand jury's secrecy can help to
protect the reputations of those who are investigated but ultimately cleared
42
of wrongdoing.
1.

Insulating Grand Jurors'Identities and Deliberationsfrom
Public Scrutiny

This need for secrecy in the process, which was quite evident from the
grand jury's earliest origins, also may play a role in the low frequency of
indictments in cases involving allegations of unjustified police violence.
This is because the grand jurors, shielded from public accountability, can
more easily permit their own biases to drive their decision-making. The
43
grand jury enjoys a historical reputation as the "voice of the community."
The typically larger size of the grand jury perhaps affords the potential for
broader representation and the chance that the grand jury will reflect a fair
cross-section of the community." However, in practice, there is not typi-

" See EDWARDs, supra note 7, at 14.
See id.
39 See id.
40 See BEALE, supra note 17, at § 5:1; Daniel C. Richman, GrandJury Secrecy: Plugging
the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 339, 352-53 (1999).
41 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005).
42 See, e.g., Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 748.
43 See Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 67, 78 (1995).
4 See Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 703, 715 n.49, 745, 745 n.241. But see Kevin K.
Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
GRAND JuRY 253, 266-77 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr., ed. 2011).
38
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cally a voir dire or other mechanism for ensuring representativeness and
diversity in the grand jury. 45
If a particular grand jury reflected narrow and biased pro-law enforcement views, it would be very difficult to persuade a majority of grand jurors
to return an indictment against a law enforcement officer regardless of the
evidence presented. 46 When you overlay issues of race that have been a
feature of many of these police killing cases, 47 the obstacles can become
even more significant, particularly when the decisions are made behind
closed doors by individuals who are completely unaccountable to the public
for their decisions.
Furthermore, for one who feels that the grand jury has not performed
appropriately in a given case, making a compelling argument to that effect is
an uphill battle. As discussed above, the grand jury process is secret by
design. In most cases, the public gets no information about what evidence is
presented to the grand jury. 48 Therefore, estimations about whether the grand
jury's decision in any given case is supported by the evidence usually are
doomed from the start. One can speculate but, because one can never know
exactly what evidence the grand jury considered and the light in which it
was cast by the prosecutor, one can never know whether the grand jury's
decision was reasonable. 49
This stands in stark contrast to the petit jury context in which public
trials can be observed and the evidence may be assessed. Although one
0
cannot be certain about the dynamics in jury deliberations, all facets of the
trial accessible to the jurors are available to the public.' However, if a
grand jury were predisposed not to approve charges against law enforcement
despite the evidence in the case, the cover of secrecy and anonymity certainly would also facilitate their nullification. In other words, the lack of

45

(2012).

See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Batson's GrandJury DNA, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1511

46 See, e.g., Harry Enten, The Grand Jury in the Eric Garner Chokehold Case Was Especially Unlikely to Indict, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT, (Dec. 3, 2014), https://fivethirtyeight.com/data
lab/eric-garner-chokehold-staten-island-grand-jury-indict/, archived at https://perma.cc/Y89BWLEG.
4 See generally Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to
Police Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (2016).
48 Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 748-49.
49 One glaring exception is the Ferguson case in which the prosecutor took the unprecedented step of releasing the grand jury transcripts. See infra Part II.A.2; The Testimony the
GrandJury Heard in the Michael Brown Case, ST. Louis TIMES-DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedialspecial/the-testimony-the-grand-jury-heard-in-thearchived at https://
michael-brown/html 47d95368-a8f2-5ael-9173-6653cl5dOfOe.html
perma.cc/2KSP-EWTA.
50 See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987); FED. R. EVID. 606. But see
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (permitting evidentiary inquiry into juror's statement of reliance on racial stereotypes in jury deliberations).
' See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S 209, 212-13 (2010); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-58 (1968) (describing evolution and role of petit jury).
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transparency leads to a lack of accountability on the part of the grand jurors
for their decision.
All of that said, one of the very purposes of grand jury secrecy is to
shield the grand jurors from external influences." If public sentiment in
favor of (or against) the return of an indictment in a police killing case were
permitted to influence grand jurors, this important safeguard of the integrity
of grand juror deliberations would be compromised. Indeed, the grand jury's
design subordinates transparency and accountability to the desire to protect
the grand jury from external pressure.53
2.

Insulating ProsecutorialPerformance From Public Scrutiny

When a prosecutor makes a decision not to bring charges against a police officer in one of these cases, he or she must face public scrutiny of that
decision. Also, because most American chief prosecutors are elected, 4 there
is added significance to the public pressure placed upon these decisions. In
the highly-charged atmosphere surrounding a police killing of an unarmed
civilian, for example, a prosecutor may have one eye on the evidence and
another on the polling data leading up to the next election.
The secrecy of the grand jury process has two main implications here.
First, a prosecutor trying to avoid public accountability for an unpopular
charging decision has the ability to simply hide behind the grand jury and
assign blame to it for the decision either to indict or not to indict."5 In the
Ferguson case, the prosecutor had the choice to file criminal homicide
charges against the officer who shot and killed Michael Brown." Instead, he
chose to commit to the grand jury the decision whether the charges should
go forward." Although it is impossible to know whether any particular
prosecutor who has the choice uses the grand jury to avoid taking the blame
for his or her own decision not to proceed with charges in a given case, the
practice would not be surprising given the intense public scrutiny of these
prosecutorial decisions.
Second, the secrecy of the grand jury shields from public view whether
the prosecutor even put forth a good faith effort to persuade the grand jury to
52 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 748.
5 See Fairfax, Jr., supra note 18, at 748-49.
See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
10-11 (2007); Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528,
1528 (2012); Ronald F. Wright, How ProsecutorElections Fail Us, 6 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
589 (2009).
s See infra Part II.B.2.
56 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.010 (West); State v. McGee, 757 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
1 See Ben Trachtenberg, No, You "Stand Up": Why ProsecutorsShould Stop Hiding Behind Grand Juries, 80 Mo. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (2015). But see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Vox
Populi: Robert McColloch, Ferguson, & the Roles of Prosecutorsand Grand Juries in HighProfile Cases, 80 Mo. L. REv. 1111, 1112 (2015).
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return an indictment. For example, as discussed below," a review of the
Ferguson grand jury transcript - something to which researchers rarely, if
ever, have access - raises questions whether prosecutors put forth a robust
effort to convince the grand jurors to indict in the case." Also, although we
do not have the grand jury transcripts in other recent cases, commentators
have raised similar questions about the prosecutorial efforts in some of those
cases as well.6 0 If a prosecutor wants to use the grand jury to insulate from
criticism his or her decision not to pursue charges in particular case, the
secrecy of the grand jury is a powerful tool.
3.

Legal Instructions to the Grand Jury

The prosecutor is often referred to as the "legal advisor" to the grand
jury. 6 This is because there is no judge present in grand jury proceedings
and questions that grand jurors have regarding the law governing the case
must be answered by the prosecutor. The grand jurors, of course, typically
are laypeople and rely heavily upon the prosecutor's explanations of legal
doctrines and principles. As an officer of the court subject to ethical regulation,6 2 the prosecutor is expected to act in good faith when instructing the
grand jurors on the law.63
Nevertheless, the legal instructions given to the grand jury by the prosecutor - which are particularly important in cases involving justification defenses to homicide or use of deadly force allegations - are shrouded in
secrecy and generally not subject to review. As we saw in the Ferguson
case, the prosecutor's instructions to the grand jury were flawed at best, and
may have actually impacted the grand jury's decision on the indictment."

" See infra Part 1I.B.
* See Levine, supra note 15, at 766; Ruth Steinhardt, Missouri Grand Jury Declines to
Indict Police Officer in FatalShooting, GW TODAY (Nov. 26, 2014), https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/
missouri-grand-jury-declines-indict-police-officer-fatal-shooting, archivedat https://perma.cc/
CGN2-4TLF; Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand Jury, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 25,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-grand-jury, archived at https://perma
.cc/7SXA-LGF2.
60 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 15, at 766-67 (2016); Trachtenberg, supra note 57, at
1101-02; see also Ari Melber, The Tamir Rice Case Shows How Prosecutors Twist Grand
Juries to Protect Police, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/12/29/in-tamir-rices-case-the-grand-jury-process-was-turned-upsidedown/?utmterm=.e884bbe63e 1l, archived at https://perma.cc/2YWK-A2YS.
61 See BEALE ET. AL, supra note 17, at § 4:15; Kristin Henning, Status, Race and the Rule
of Law in the Grand Jury, 58 How. L.J. 833, 841 (2015). Cf Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The
GrandJury Legal Advisor: Resurrectingthe GrandJury'sShield, 98 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
1171 (2008).
62
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR AssN 2014); MODEL
CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, DR 7-103 (AM. BAR AssN 1980).
63 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR AssN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-4.5.

1 See, e.g., Henning, supra note 61, at 841-43; Jeffrey Fagan & Bernard Harcourt,
Professors Fagan and HarcourtProvide Facts on Grand Jury Practice in Light of Ferguson
Decision (Dec. 2014), http://www.1aw.columbia.edu/media-inquiries/newsevents/2014/no-
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The secrecy of the legal instructions to the grand jury can be a barrier to
public confidence in the outcome of grand jury proceedings. To be sure, a
defendant who desires to challenge her indictment by a grand jury may, in
certain circumstances, petition the court to disclose the legal instructions the
prosecutor gave to the grand jurors.65 However, if the public is dissatisfied
with a grand jury's decision not to indict in a given case, there is no ability to
have the prosecutor's legal instructions reviewed for either legal error or bad
faith.
B.

1.

The ProsecutorialFunction as an Obstacle to Indictments
in Police Violence Cases
The Outsized Role of the Prosecutor in the Grand Jury Process

The prosecutor has a degree of control of grand jury proceedings that is
unparalleled in the criminal justice system.66 Consider the preliminary hearing, in which the government is tasked with demonstrating to the court that
probable cause exists to warrant going to trial. In that proceeding, there is a
defense attorney and a judge present, and each of these actors has the ability
to challenge the prosecutor and her presentation of evidence." The defense
counsel can cross-examine government witnesses and introduce evidence to
rebut the assertions advanced by the prosecutor.66 The judge can assess the
credibility of government witnesses firsthand and can ensure that the prosecutor is making arguments grounded in the evidence. Likewise, at trial, all
of the criminal procedural rights, such as the right to cross-examination, the
defendant's right to compel witnesses to testify, and the right to testify, all
place checks on the prosecutor.
Not so in the grand jury context. Indeed, the grand jury gives the prosecutor nearly limitless ability to shape the presentation of the evidence and
influence the grand jurors. 69 There is no judge to oversee the prosecutor's
presentation and no defense attorney to offer a competing narrative. 70 Although the grand jury technically has the authority to subpoena its own witnesses and evidence, most grand jurors either do not have the information or
do not have the will to exert control over proceedings. 7' Thus, grand jurors

vember20l4/Facts-on-Ferguson-Grand-Jury, archived at https://perma.cc/4NY3-E62M. See
Steinhardt, supra note 59.
65 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. L. 190.25(6); see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A ProposedAddition to the FederalRules of Criminal ProcedureRequiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor'sLegal Instructions to the Grand Jury, 38 Am. CRim. L.
REv. 1443 (2001).
66 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 15, at
753.
67 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM P. 5.1.
68

Id.

69
7o

See, e.g., Levine, supra note 15, at 760-62.
Id.

71

See id.;

BEALE ET. AL,

supra note 17, at

§ 4:15.
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typically will only see and hear what the prosecutor wants.7 2 As a result, the
prosecutor has outsized influence over the outcome of grand jury
proceedings.
2.

ProsecutorialMotives in Police Killing Cases

The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States elect their prosecutors. 73 For better or worse, most prosecutors may have reason to be con-

cerned about public opinion in high-profile cases, despite ethical
admonitions to ignore such considerations. 74 Given the central role prosecutors play in the grand jury, therefore, they may seek to use the grand jury to
shield themselves from public backlash for an unpopular charging decision
in a police killing case. This is particularly so because prosecutors have the
ability to shape the proceedings as they see fit. If a prosecutor is not inclined to bring a case against a law enforcement officer, a weak presentation
before a grand jury can both make the case go away and protect the prosecutor from those who advocated pursuit of the charges. As mentioned above,
7
the secrecy of the grand jury facilitates this strategy. 1
Potential motivations are curious given that prosecutors typically bring
cases before the grand jury with the intention of obtaining an indictment.
Although the prosecutor is sometimes referred to as the legal advisor to the
grand jury, 76 the prosecutor's presentation of evidence usually is designed to
lead to the grand jury approving the charges in the case. Indeed, given the
low standard of proof and the historical high rate of indictment, there might
even be more professional stigma associated with failure to obtain an indictment than for failure to obtain a conviction at trial. In other words, the
prosecutor usually is advocating for the charges in the vast run of cases
brought to the grand jury. 77 In the police violence context, however, it is
possible that some prosecutors approach their role in the grand jury
differently.
While the records of grand jury proceedings are almost never made
available, the released transcripts from the Ferguson police shooting case
arguably reveal a relatively tepid effort on the part the prosecutors to obtain
an indictment.78 The prosecutors called would-be government witnesses
before the grand jury and impeached their credibility with statements they
72 Id.
7

(2009).

Ronald F. Wright, How ProsecutorElections Fail Us, 6 OH. ST. J.

CRIM.

L. 581, 589

7 See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (AM. BAR
Ass'N 1993).
1 See supra Part II.A.
76 See sources cited supra note 61.
" See, e.g., Levine, supra note 15, at 746-47.
7 See id. at 760-62, 766; Steinhardt, supra note 59; see also The Testimony the Grand
Jury Heard in the Michael Brown Case, ST. Louis TIMES-DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://
www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/special/the-testimony-the-grand-jury-heard-in-the-mich
ael-brown/html_47d95368-a8f2-5ael-9173-6653cl5d0fe.html.
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allegedly made in the media.79 The prosecutors also failed to aggressively
challenge flaws in the local police department's handling of the forensic evidence from the shooting scene.s0
Finally, the prosecutors did not appear to mount an aggressive crossexamination of the target of the grand jury investigation when officer Darren
Wilson testified." Typically, when a prosecutor has the opportunity to question a defendant under oath at trial or in the grand jury, the result is a blistering cross-examination designed to challenge the defendant's version of
events and bolster the government's theory of the case. The need for this
type of scrutiny is particularly acute in self-defense or other justifiable homicide cases in which the defendant is the only one of the principal parties still
alive and able to testify. In the Ferguson case, the questioning was relatively
light and did not seem designed to challenge the officer's narrative at all,
despite the obvious incentive to do so in a case involving an asserted defense
of justifiable homicide.8 2
As described above, the prosecutors in Ferguson did not seem to be
advocating in favor of the grand jury returning an indictment." To be sure,
some have argued that the more neutral approach to grand jury presentations
used in the Ferguson case - and presumably employed by prosecutors in
similar police killing cases - is preferable to the typical, more aggressive
attempt to obtain indictments in other types of criminal cases, and that this
same sort of even-handed treatment should be extended to all targets of
grand jury investigations.8 4 However, the neutral approach seems to be reserved for police cases.
III.

REFORM PROPOSALS

Understandably, a great deal of anger and confusion came in the wake
of the recent high-profile cases in which the grand jury declined to indict
officers who killed unarmed civilians."5 Some well-meaning and insightful
" Steinhardt, supra note 59.
s See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Tom Hamburger, Unorthodox Police ProceduresEmerge in
GrandJury Documents, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/seemingly-unorthodox-police-procedures-emerge-in-grand-jury-documents/2014/11/25/48
152574-74e0-lle4-bdlb-03009bd3e984_story.html?utmterm=.bf5el886a792,
archived at
https://perma.cc/SRL7-LXJU.
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Marisol Bello, Greg Toppo, and Peter Eisler, Grand Jury Charges Are Easy,
Except Against Police, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/11/25/ferguson-grand-jury/70098616/, archived at https://perma.cc/25PQ-DFK5.
* See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 59.
* See Henning, supra note 61, at 838-43; Levine, supra note 15, at 771-75.
* See, e.g., Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer
is Not Indicted, N.Y. TnwES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/
53ME-U3LJ; J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn't
Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TuvEs, Dec. 3, 2015, https://www.nytimes
.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-
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critics of the administration of criminal justice in the United States focused
the blame on the grand jury itself and called for its abolition in the wake of
these tragic cases." As the author has argued elsewhere,'this is a misguided
response." Despite the structural features of the grand jury that may make
indictment in police violence cases more difficult, there is still tremendous
value in using the grand jury in this context."
That said, we Must ensure that the grand jury and mechanisms of due
process operate effectively, even when police officers are being investigated
or accused. In the wake of these tragedies that seem to continue with alarming frequency," a number of reform proposals have been developed to address the perceived shortcomings of the grand jury in police violence cases.9 0
This Part considers some of these reform proposals, including the most
promising one, which is directed primarily at the prosecutor rather than the
grand jury.

&

death-of-eric-gamer.html archived at https://perma.cc/L3AU-4D26; see also Roger A. Fairfax,
Jr., Should the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 HOWARD L. J. 825, 826-27
(2015).
86 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58
How. L.J. 825, 826 n.8 (2015).
7
Id. at 827-31.
" Indeed, rather than abolishing the grand jury, we should seek to put it to greater use in
order to address problems in the administration of justice. One potential use, for example, is
the seldom-used power of the grand jury to issue reports on allegations of official misconduct.
When a federal criminal civil rights investigation fails to yield charges under the exceptionally
high standard employed in those cases, the Justice Department sometimes still conducts an
investigation of the jurisdiction. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF JUST. Civ. RTS. DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015). Federal and most state grand
juries have the authority to issue reports. See 18 U.S.C. § 3331; GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE § 2:2 (2d ed. 2016). The use of this grand jury function to expose more systemic causes of
unjustified police violence in jurisdictions would not only provide the opportunity to shine
light on these matters of public concern, but would demonstrate the grand jury's continued
relevance in the modern criminal justice system. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury
Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 Wm
MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 342-44 (2010).
89 See Kimberly Kindy et al., Fatal Shootings By Police Police Are Up in the FirstSix
Months of 2016, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationallfatalshootings-by-police-surpass-2015s-rate/2016/07/07/81b708f2-3d42- 1e6-84e8-1580c7db5275
_story.html?utmterm=.f390dcae6f3a, archived at https://perma.cc/T6HL-AYKF. Cf Ricardo Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, Texas, 581 U.S. _ (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(slip op. at 7 n.2) (noting that "commentators have observed the increasing frequency of incidents in which unarmed men allegedly reach to empty waistbands when facing armed
officers").
9o Although grand jury reforms are not among the reform measures mentioned by President Obama in his recent article summarizing his criminal justice legacy, he did acknowledge
that the Task Force on 21st Century Policing was launched "in the wake of events in Ferguson,
Cleveland, and New York City." Barack Obama, The President'sRole in Advancing Criminal
Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 840 (2017). See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY
POLICING (2015).
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Judicial Oversight of the Grand Jury

Following the grand jury's decision not to indict in the Eric Garner incident, New York State entertained a number of grand jury reform proposals.
The chief judge of the New York high court proposed the addition of a judge
to grand jury proceedings to supervise the process and the prosecutor's conduct.91 This proposal responds to the concern that, left solely to the prosecutor, the grand jury process in police cases will not receive the same level of
effort and advocacy as other criminal matters.92 The process also would presumably provide a safeguard against erroneous legal instructions given to
the grand jurors.93
However, there is no guarantee that the presence of a judge would make
such indictments more likely. In fact, the presence of a judge could have a
chilling effect in cases where the prosecutor is attempting to make a difficult
case against a police officer and the judge disapproves of the prosecutorial
decision to pursue charges. In addition, by adding a judge to the process, the
grand jury moves ever closer toward resembling a trial, which is counter to
the spirit and purpose of the grand jury, which was designed as a preliminary
proceeding.9 4
B.

Remove Option of Utilizing Grand Jury in Police Killing Cases

Recall that, despite the fact that in Missouri the prosecutor is able to
bring murder charges without the intervention of the grand jury, St. Louis
County chief prosecutor Robert McCulloch chose to present the charges to a
grand jury.95 In the wake of Ferguson, the California state legislature passed
S.B. 227, which prohibited prosecutors from using the grand jury in most
cases in which a police officer is suspected of shooting or using excessive
force against a civilian leading to their death." The effect of the law was to
remove the option of committing the prosecutorial decision to the grand jury
in cases involving police killings. In other words, the law effectively abolished the grand jury in police killing cases.97

i See

JONATHAN LIPPMAN,

ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING

THE

IDEAL

A REALITY, THE

2015 2-4 (Feb. 17, 2015); Editorial, A Judge's Ideafor Grand Jury
Reform, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/ajudges-idea-for-grand-jury-reform.html, archived at https://perma.cc/P4Z8-L2UC. The chief
judge also proposed the disclosure of grand jury transcripts in police killing cases and the
appointment of a special prosecutor in cases in which police officers are accused. See id. at
3-4.
92 See supra Part II.B.
9 See supra Part II.A.3.
94 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48-50 (1992).
" See supra Part II.A.2.
9 See S.B. 227, 2015 Senate (Cal. 2015) (amending Section 919 of the CAL. PENAL
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY

CODE).

" The bill was signed into law by Governor Brown in August of 2015. In January of
2017, the California Court of Appeals declared the law invalid under the California State
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The bill's backers seemed to be motivated by a desire for transparency
in the charging decisions made by prosecutors."8 The prosecutors, who are
elected, must make charging decisions based on the evidence and are held
accountable for their decisions at the ballot box. However, while a prosecutor would no longer be able to hide behind the grand jury's refusal to indict a
police officer, 99 the law could be viewed as simply removing community
involvement from the charging process and placing the charging decision
exclusively in the hands of the prosecutor. If the concern is that some prosecutors will be inclined to manipulate the grand jury process behind the
scenes to avoid bringing these types of prosecutions, there may be little confidence - electoral accountability notwithstanding - that the same prosecutors will choose to bring these cases in the absence of the grand jury.
C.

DiscardPreferential Treatment of Police Defendants
in Grand Jury Proceedings

Recent statistics on fatal police shootings in the state of Georgia are
startling. About half of the over 180 people shot and killed by police in
Georgia between 2010 and 2015 were either unarmed or were shot by police
in the back. 100 A study of a subset of over 170 fatal police shootings during
that same timeframe revealed that prosecutors took 48 cases to the grand
jury, and asked for an indictment in only nine.10' A grand jury indicted in
only one of those cases, and the judge dismissed that manslaughter charge
shortly thereafter. 102

Constitution. See Court Tosses California Law that Barred Grand Juriesfrom Investigating
Police Shootings, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.latimes.comlocal/lanow/la-me-Ingrand-jury-police-shootings-2017011 1-story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/5K8R-3BJG.
" See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, State Ends Secret Hearings in Police Killings of Civilians,
S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 11, 2015, http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/California-eliminatesuse-of-grand-juries-to-6438501.php, archived at https://perma.cc/6LQF-EHEZ; Allie Gross,
CaliforniaBecomes the First State to Ban Grand Juries in Police Shooting Cases, MOTHER
JONEs, Aug. 13, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/08/california-becomes-firststate-ban-grand-juries-police-shooting-cases, archived at https://perma.cc/2KTB-E968. Although California was the first state to pass such a law, the Hennepin County, Minnesota
prosecutor recently announced that he would no longer use the grand jury in police shooting
cases. See David Chanen & Libor Jany, Hennepin County to Stop Using Grand Juries in
Officer-Involved Shootings, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 16, 2016, http://www.startribune.com/hennepin-county-attorney-to-provide-update-into-jamar-clark-inquiry/372229891/,
archived at
https://perma.cc/6VWU-3CX8.
* See supra Part II.A.2.

" See Brad Schrade & Jennifer Peebles, Unarmed and Shot in the Back,

ATLANTA JOUR-

http://investigations.myajc.com/overtheline/ga-police-shootings/ archived
at https://perma.cc/MTN5-FEZ4.
"o' See Brad Schrade & Jennifer Peebles, 171 Shot Dead, Zero Prosecuted, ATLANTA
NAL-CONSTITUTION,

JOURNAL CONSTITUTION,

http://investigations.myajc.com/overtheline/prosecuted/ archived at

https://perma.cc/PT3N-BDVB.
02 See Katie Mettler, Atlanta Grand Jury Issues Murder Indictment in FatalPolice Shooting of Unarmed Man, WASH. PosT (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2016/09/01/in-rare-move-atlanta-grand-jury-indicts-fired-police-officer-on-
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The rarity of grand jury indictments in Georgia police shooting cases
may not be surprising to some. Until very recently, Georgia had the nation's
most pro-police set of procedures relating to the prosecution of police officers for unjustified violence.1 03 Police officers in Georgia, until 2016, had
the right to be present during the entirety of the grand jury proceeding and
listen to and observe - in person - all of the witness testimony against
them.'" At the conclusion of the grand jury presentation, the police officer
was given the last word, with an opportunity to make a statement to the
05
grand jurors without any rebuttal by the prosecutor.
In 2016, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal signed a law that removed the
ability of police officers to be present throughout the grand jury proceeding.1 06 Now, police officers may make a statement to the grand jurors, but
cannot observe the proceeding in its entirety.' 07 Furthermore, these police
officer statements can be challenged by the prosecutor through cross-exanination. 0 An additional feature of the law mandates a transcript of grand
jury proceedings so that there is a public record of the evidence considered
by the grand jury.0
While these reforms represent a tremendous improvement on the prior
procedure, they still place the fate of such proceedings in the hands of a local
prosecutor who may or may not lack the independence necessary for effective prosecution of these types of cases before the grand jury.
D.

Additional ProceduralMechanisms to Supplement the Grand Jury

The Grand Jury Reform Act of 2015, a bill introduced in the 114th
Congress, sought to respond to the prevalence of grand jury indictment declinations in police killing cases by creating an additional procedural mechanism." 0 Under the bill, a state receiving certain federal funding must adopt a
procedure whereby any death resulting from the use of deadly force by law
enforcement would require notification of the governor of the state, who
would then select, at random, a local elected prosecutor from a different
jurisdiction in the state to serve as a special prosecutor."'

murder-charge-in-fatal-shooting/?utmjterm= .87049c9f8a74, archived at https://perma.cc/
657A-HGJC.
03 See Brad Schrade, Grand Jury Privilege Curtailedfor Ga. Officers in Shooting Cases,
ATLANTA JoURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.myajc.com/news/grand-juryarchived at
privilege-curtailed-for-officers-shooting-cases/W3RYQj915ibJFHmVLRf3cN/,
https://perma.cc/K9DU-TRZJ.
'0 See id.
105 See id.
6

' Id.

107 Id.

108 Id.
1 Id.
"o Grand Jury Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 429, 114th Cong. (2015).
" Id. at § 3.
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Within ninety days of the appointment, the special prosecutor would be
required to present evidence in a public hearing, after which a judge would
determine whether there is probable cause.11 2 This judicial determination,
along with the written charging recommendation of the special prosecutor,
would be transmitted to the prosecutor in the jurisdiction where the killing
occurred."' The bill makes clear that the procedure "shall be purely advisory, and shall have no binding effect on the elected prosecutor of the locality in which the death occurred."ll 4
However, despite having thirty-two co-sponsors, the bill was not
passed."' Even if the legislation were to become law, it notably leaves the
decision whether to prosecute - or even go to a grand jury - to the local
prosecutor."'6 While there is the hope that the public hearing would promote
transparency and accountability, ultimately it does not ensure that the crucial
decision to seek an indictment is in the hands of a prosecutor independent of
the local law enforcement community in the jurisdiction.
E.

Enhance Transparency of the Grand Jury Process

A number of jurisdictions have considered or adopted proposals to enhance the transparency of the grand jury process by making public the transcripts of grand jury witness testimony and legal instructions given to the
grand jurors."' As discussed above, the lack of transparency caused by the
grand jury's secrecy can contribute to a lack of confidence that the prosecutor - or the grand jurors themselves - seriously and fairly considered
charges against police defendants in cases in which there was no indictment.
Of course, this legitimate desire for transparency must be balanced with
the very real benefits derived from grand jury secrecy. While disclosure of
the legal instructions given to grand jurors is generally a good idea,"' it is
not clear whether releasing witness testimony would lead to more indictments in these types of cases. There would be a tremendous disincentive for
a police officer witness to testify against a fellow police officer if his or her
I12

Id. at § 3(c).

"I Id. at
4
11 Id. at
"
''

6

Id.
Id. at

§ 3(f).
§ 3(h).

§ 3(h).

"'7 See, e.g., LIPPMAN, supra note 91, at 3-4; Schrade, supra note 103; Editorial, Bill on

GrandJury Reform a Welcome Move Toward Transparency, STATEN

ISLAND ADVANCE

(Dec.

&

8, 2014), http://www.silive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/12/bill-on-grand-jury-reform-a_we
.html, archivedat https://perma.cc/G6JZ-2B7V; see also Lauren-Brooke Eisen, What is on the
Horizon for Grand Jury Reform?, HuFF. POST (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/laurenbrooke-eisen/what-is-on-the-horizon-fo-b_6535090.html, archived at https://per
ma.cc/A63M-UGUR.
us See NATL Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, FEDERAL GRAND JURY REFORM REPORT
BILL OF RIGHTS

(2000); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A ProposedAddition to the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure Requiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor's Legal Instructions to the
GrandJury, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1443, 1446-48 (2001) (proposing a rule that would require
grand jury instructions to be disclosed to defendants).
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testimony would be made public. Also, civilian witnesses might be less
likely to testify against a police officer if their testimony and identities were
to be disclosed. Finally, the secrecy of the grand jury is also designed to
protect the reputations of those who are ultimately cleared by the investigation. That value could be in tension with a system in which the full proceed9
ings of the grand jury were made available for public consumption."
F.

Ensuring the Independence of the Prosecutor

Perhaps the most important factor related to the grand jury's effectiveness in these cases is the real or perceived lack of independence of the prosecutor who is tasked with investigating and bringing charges against law
enforcement officers. As discussed above, prosecutors work closely with
20
law enforcement in the discharge of their duties.1 Prosecutors depend upon
police officers to investigate criminal allegations, gather evidence, and give
testimony at trial. Prosecutors entrust entire criminal cases to the work of
law enforcement officers, and vice versa. As a result of this close working
relationship, there is a real concern that prosecutors are unable to be objective in assessing criminal allegations lodged against law enforcement officers. When prosecutors seem unable or unwilling to pursue criminal
charges against police officers, some chalk it up to prosecutorial bias in
favor of the law enforcement agencies with which they work on a daily
basis.
Consequently, there have been many calls for the use of independent
prosecutors to handle investigations of police officers.121 Particularly in the
wake of the high-profile cases involving police killings, there have been proposals for the provision of independent prosecutors with no prior connection
to the jurisdiction in which the law enforcement officer discharges his or her
duties.1 22 By ensuring the independence of the prosecutor from the agency

119 As mentioned above, there are significant burdens associated with simply being put on
trial, even if one is ultimately acquitted. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1090,
1098 (2014); see also supra text accompanying note 26.
120 See supra Part I.
121 See, e.g., Jordain Carney, House Dems: Use Independent Prosecutorsfor Police Shootings, THE HILL (Dec. 29, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/264389-dems-useindependent-prosecutors-for-police-shootings, archived at https://perma.cc/EM8A-RRJL; Editorial, Police Deadly Force Cases CallforIndependent Prosecutors,CHI. TRm., Dec. 21, 2015,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-laquan-mcdonald-special-prosecutor-law-edit-20151221-story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/46Y4-EPUD; Editorial, Police
Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH. PosT, Dec. 6, 2014, https://www.washington
7
7 2
e 8- cd6post.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-special-prosecutors/2014/12/06/fcf5
at
https://perma.cc/
archived
ld7ce687db,
lb
11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e-story.html?utmterm=.
Q57X-A8MH.
122 See, e.g., Ruben Rosario, After Philando Castile's Death, Time for an Independent
Prosecutor in Police Shootings, TwIN CITES PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www
.twincities.com/2016/08/03/rosario-its-time-for-a-special-prosecutor/, archived at https://per
ma.cc/3JK7-BLEF.
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of the police officer, there will be a greater chance that the grand jury investigation will be conducted in an appropriate manner.
Three basic independent prosecutor models have been proposed. The
first is the temporary independent prosecutor brought in from another jurisdiction. This "guest" prosecutor could be from a neighboring county or city
within the state, and could be given access to the grand jury in the jurisdiction in which the incident occurred. This arrangement would avoid the danger of prosecutorial partiality borne of the prior relationship with the accused
law enforcement officer or the employing agency.' 23
A second model contemplates the appointment of a private attorney
who is deputized to prosecute the case against police officers in a jurisdiction. Again, this private, deputized prosecuting attorney would be given access to the grand jury in those jurisdictions requiring or permitting
indictment. There are serious questions to be asked about the use of private
attorneys exercising the discretion entrusted to public prosecutors. 12 4 However, the desire for independence from law enforcement in a given community may outweigh the concern about private attorneys discharging the
prosecutorial function.
A third model involves the installation of a permanent government attorney, not resident in the prosecutor's office, tasked with handling the investigation and prosecution of law enforcement officers within the
jurisdiction. The state of New York recently adopted this model following
the outrage after the Staten Island grand jury's refusal to indict officer Daniel
Pantaleo in the chokehold killing of Eric Garner.'25
All of these models raise the question of whether there is sufficient
accountability when an independent prosecutor is brought in to usurp the
prosecutor elected by the community in which the case is being considered.1 26 However, the accountability concern, though important, must give
123 See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability Restoring
Trust and
Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. U. J. L. & Pus.
POL'Y 137, 151 (2015).
124 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution? The
Limits of Criminal
Justice Privatization,2010 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 265, 283-97.
125 The inaugural holder of this position, Alvin Bragg, is a
senior attorney in the state
Attorney General's office and has experience as a federal prosecutor in Manhattan. See Erica
Orden, Lead ProsecutorNamed for N.Y. Police Deadly-Force Cases, WALL ST. J. (July 9,
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lead-prosecutor-named-for-n-y-police-deadly-forcecases-1436475430, archived at https://perma.cc/9BF9-5J2R. Bragg is responsible for investigating all cases involving police killings of unarmed civilians throughout the state of New
York. See id.
26 The late Brooklyn District Attorney Kenneth Thompson, who was aggressive in pursuing indictments of police officers for unjustified killings, opposed the use of special prosecutors in these cases on accountability grounds. See Statement of Brooklyn District Attorney
Ken Thompson On Call By New York State Attorney General to Act as Special Prosecutor in
Cases of Fatal Shootings (Dec. 16, 2014), http://brooklynda.org/2014/12/16/statement-ofbrooklyn-district-attorney-ken-thompson-on-call-by-new-york-state-attorney-general-to-actas-special-prosecutor-in-cases-of-fatal-shootings/, archived at https://perma.cc/28JL-GDS2.
Baltimore City State's Attorney Marilyn Mosby, who supervised the Freddie Gray cases, also
resisted calls for an independent prosecutor on grounds of community accountability. See
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way to the need to avoid conflicts of interest in cases involving the prosecution of law enforcement officers. Indeed, the independence of the prosecutor
is crucial to public confidence in the outcome of these grand jury investigations, whether or not they result in an indictment.
CONCLUSION

It bears repeating that some police officers are not indicted by grand
juries because there is, in fact, no probable cause to believe that they committed a crime. The circumstances of a particular violent police encounter,
though tragic, may have involved a justified use of deadly force. In those
cases, the grand jury properly declined to indict. However, it is unlikely that
virtually all cases involving police killings of civilians lack the probable
cause to proceed to trial. Thus, it is important to examine the role, the structure, and the function of the grand jury in the disposition of those cases.
Even though many of the proposed reforms are imperfect, they represent worthwhile attempts to construct a more just system in which no one
is above the law. But grand jury reform is but one piece of the larger effort
to prevent these tragic events from continuing with the depressing frequency
of the past few years. Bringing charges in these cases does not guarantee
that justice will be served. Indeed, as we witnessed in the Walter Scott case,
the videotaped shooting of an unarmed man in the back was not enough to
secure a conviction at trial. 127
Furthermore, while a just conviction is certainly welcomed and deserved by families of those unjustly killed by law enforcement, those families would much rather have their loved one alive. In order to prevent these
tragedies in the first place, we must continue to invest in training law enforcement and supporting best practices on threat assessment, implicit bias,
and the use of force. We must also work on fostering police and community
relations, and promoting within both law enforcement and the larger society
a culture of tolerance and mutual respect that honors the dignity and conse-

Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Richard Perez-Pena, Baltimore Case is Full of Conflicts, Lawyers for
Officers Contend, N.Y. TviEs (May 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/us/justicedepartment-begins-civil-rights-inquiry-into-baltimore-police.html, archived at https://perma
.cclLG39-LB8M.
127 See Alan Blinder, Mistrial for South Carolina Officer Who Shot Walter Scott, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/walter-scott-michael-slagernorth-charleston.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7QJX-2E6Q. The state has indicated that it
plans to retry Slager on the murder charges, and federal charges are pending. See Andrew
Knapp, State Retrial of Michael Slager Set for March 1, 2017, Ahead of Federal Proceeding,
POST AND COURIER (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.postandcourier.com/news/state-retrial-ofmichael-slager-set-for-march-ahead-of/articlefld4eOc4-ce0a-1 1e6-ac47-17a7cl99c2ea.html,
archivedat https://perma.cc/BE4F-JAGL. See generally Michael Sokolove, What Does It Take
to Convict a Cop?, MOTHER JONES (March/April 2017), http.www.motherjones.com/politics/
2017/01/michael-slager-trial-walter-scott-police-shooting-north-charleston-south-carloina,
archived at https://perma.cc/S9XG-KTTS.
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quence of every life protected daily by "the heroic backbone of our communities."'2 8 Nothing is a panacea, but it is all worth the effort.

128

Obama, supra note 1, at 840.

